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Abstract
This paper applies a set of unit root and cointegration tests with non-linear error-
correction mechanisms to a subset of the OECD countries to investigate the empirical
conclusions of some of the labor market models in the literature. I generally find that
the unemployment rate, productivity, and real wages have a unit root even if one
controls for threshold effects. This finding justifies the use of a cointegration approach
to assess the existence of a long-run equilibrium among the variables of interest. For
roughly half of the OECD countries in the sample, the unemployment rate, real wages,
and productivity trend together over time. For four countries (i.e, Germany, Japan,
Sweden, and the US) the adjustment to the long run relationship appears mostly
asymmetric. Also, an impulse response function analysis suggests that real wages and
productivity adjust faster to the long-run equilibrium, while shocks to unemployment
take longer to extinguish. Also, according to the sign of the shocks, the unemployment
rates respond differently. These findings suggest that a proper analysis of the behavior
of productivity, real wages, and unemployment should consider non-linear adjustment
mechanisms to long-run equilibrium since a liner approach would be biased.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the various implications of some of the main labor market models
in the literature through the use of a set of unit root and cointegration tests with asym-
metric error-correction mechanisms. In contrast to just a linear approach, this asymmetric
framework treats differently the positive and negative shocks to a system formed by pro-
ductivity, real wages, and unemployment rates. Furthermore, this framework allows for
new insights regarding the nature of the nonlinearity in the data. Specifically, it provides
an alternative to the general approach of treating nonlinearity as arising from structural
change. A short summary regarding the alternative theoretical representations for produc-
tivity, real wages, and unemployment is provided below. The interested reader is referred
instead to Blanchard (2005) and Layard et al. (2005) who provide extensive surveys of the
literature.
First, Bruno and Sachs (1985) suggest that differences in nominal and real rigidities
(e.g., as those during the 1970’s) can explain why unemployment increases differ across
countries. Another line of research highlights the persistence effects of adverse shocks
caused by productivity slowdowns (e.g., similar to those of the 1980’s). On one hand,
Bean and Dreze (1990) suggest that capital accumulation is one cause of the persistence
effects. On the other hand, Snower (1985) and Blanchard and Summers (1986) advance
the role of insiders in the collective bargaining process as the source for these persistence
effects. This line of thought led to the reconsideration of the NAIRU concept (Phelps (1972)
and Friedman (1968)), suggesting that unemployment at the extreme exhibits hysteresis,
where temporary shocks have permanent effects. On the same lines, Layard and Nickell
(1987) suggest that duration effects (i.e., changes of the skills, motivations and search
behavior determined by an unemployment spell) can trigger long term unemployment.
However, the different pattern of the unemployment rate during the 1990’s revived the
structuralist theories of unemployment (Phelps (1995)). The low and fairly constant level
of inflation during this period suggests that unemployment has settled at a higher natural
level with causation attributed to institutional frictions. However, these findings do not
fit all the OECD countries adequately (Blanchard (2005)).
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This paper applies the models of Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos
(2001) to test these findings from a nonlinear perspective. More specifically, based on the
threshold autoregressive model of Tong (1983), Enders and Granger (1998) proposes a
threshold autoregressive unit root test (abbreviated TAR for short) where the adjustment
process depends on the location of the previous level of a series relative to a threshold
value or time trend (i.e., on whether a shock moves the system in positive or negative
territory). A momentum threshold autoregressive unit root test (abbreviated MTAR for
short) looks at the adjustment of the previous growth rate of a series relative to a threshold
value or linear trend. Similarly, Enders and Siklos (2001) apply the TAR and MTAR tests
to the regression residuals from a system of possibly cointegrated variables allowing thus
for cointegration testing in an asymmetric framework. These tests can then be adapted as
follows.
For instance, real wage rigidity is one key ingredient of these models. If TAR and
MTAR unit root tests implied stationarity, an F-test for the null of symmetric adjustment
coefficients would provide a way to assess the differences in real wage rigidities across
countries. However, I find that in most OECD countries real wages have stochastic trends
even when I allow for asymmetric adjustment from a linear trend. The same conclusion
is found for productivity. Also, even if one controls for possible threshold effects around
a level the unemployment rate has a unit root. This evidence supports the hysteresis
hypothesis of Blanchard and Summers (1986). Furthermore, the persistence effects due to
capital accumulation as in Bean and Dreze (1990) or Hellwig and Neumann (1987) suggest
that productivity, real wages, and unemployment have common trends. However, I find
evidence of cointegration only for five1 out of thirteen countries using TAR method and
four2 using MTAR approach. For four3 out of six countries one can strongly reject the null
of symmetric adjustment, suggesting that a linear approach would be biased.
According to Layard and Nickell (1987), an increase in unemployment increases the
unemployment spell and thus lowers the pressure on wages. In the countries where coin-
1These countries are Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, and UK
2These countries are Japan, Spain, UK, and the US
3The countries with asymmetric adjustment to long run equilibrium are Germany, Japan, Sweden, and
the US
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tegration holds, the evidence suggests that this assumption is confirmed. Therefore, after
an initial shock (e.g. positive and/or negative) to real wages due to either productivity or
unemployment innovations, the positive regime dominates irrespective of the sign of the
shocks. Hence, any disturbance from the initial equilibrium induces real wages to move
higher. Further, one can note that shocks to unemployment have a bigger impact than
shocks to real wages. Thus, one unit productivity, real wages, and unemployment shocks
positively affect real wages approximately between 0.01% and 4.5%. Moreover, the ef-
fect of unemployment on real wages appears asymmetric and depends upon the sign of
the shocks. However, productivity, real wages, and unemployment shocks have a big and
permanent impact on unemployment (e.g., in Sweden’s case, after a productivity shock
unemployment settles to a level that is 180% lower than the initial one). Overall, after its
own shocks real wages revert faster to long run equilibrium than unemployment does after
its own shocks.
Previous work has only considered error correction models with symmetric adjustment
(Jacobson et al. (1998); Lee (2000)). Also, empirical applications of the threshold autore-
gressive (TAR) and momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) unit root and cointegra-
tion tests have been limited to the US and Canada (Diboogˇlu and Enders (2001)) and to
some OECD countries (Leo´n-Ledesma (2002)). Also, the latter considers only the case of
unemployment rates. Regarding the asymmetric behavior of the system formed by produc-
tivity, real wages, and unemployment rates, Diboogˇlu and Enders (2001) find evidence for
the case of Canada but not for US. This finding is different from the one in this paper, but
this may be due to the shorter sample they use. Furthermore, numerous empirical studies
have investigated the hysteresis hypothesis. The empirical findings are mixed, but in gen-
eral, compared to the earlier4 empirical research, more recent5 studies find less support
for unemployment hysteresis. However, these latter studies generally treat nonstationarity
as arising only from the presence of one or more structural breaks in the data. Moreover,
they do so only for the unemployment rates but not for real wages. Therefore the approach
followed by the present paper suggests an alternative source for the nonlinearity of the
4See Neudorfer et al. (1990); Mitchell (1993); Jaeger and Parkinson (1994)
5See Song and Wu (1998); Arestis and Mariscal (2000); Papell et al. (1998)
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variables of interest that is characterized by threshold adjustment rather than structural
change.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives a short summary of the labor mar-
ket models, the implications of which I want to test using the TAR and MTAR unit root
and cointegration tests; section 3 describes the empirical results; section 4 discusses the
dynamic non-linear adjustments for the countries for which the evidence supports cointe-
gration; section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Assumptions
I follow Blanchard (2005) in outlining the economic relationships among the variables
of interest. Specifically, considering firms with constant returns to labor and competitive
markets, the wages paid by firms in a world without frictions are given by:
Wt
Pt
= wt = qt (1)
where Wt is nominal wages, Pt is the price level, wt is real wages and qt is productivity.
Blanchard (2005) assumes a random walk process for productivity and introduces frictions
by assuming that whenever a shock occurs, expected productivity adjusts gradually to
actual productivity:
E(qt) = λE(qt−1)− (1− λ)qt (2)
The parameter λ is taken as given in equation (2). In the literature, λ has been derived
using Bayesian learning in an environment in which agents (i.e. firms and workers) have
to assess whether shocks are temporary or permanent (see Blanchard (2005)). In this
framework, by taking expectations in (2), (1-λ) denotes the speed at which real wages
adjust to the initial level after a productivity slowdown. Bruno and Sachs (1985) note
that when the adjustment is slow, the adverse productivity shocks may have longer and
lasting effects, causing unemployment to rise. They argue that differences in real and
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nominal rigidities can explain why the response in unemployment levels differs across
countries experiencing similar shocks. I test this implication by allowing real wages to
display asymmetric adjustment to the pre-shock level. As I show below in more detail,
this is achieved by employing the Threshold Autoregressive unit root test that treats
positive and negative shocks differently.
The design of persistence mechanisms for unemployment has been another major de-
velopment in the literature. Specifically, these mechanisms consider the implications that
capital accumulation and collective bargaining have on real wages. Blanchard (2005) shows
that assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function under perfect competition, real wages
become a function of employment (and the unemployment rate, consequently), capital
stock, and marginal product of labor (or productivity level):
wt = (α − 1)(nt − kt + qt) + qt (3)
Here wt denotes real wages (in logarithm), nt denotes employment (in logarithm), kt is
the log of capital stock, and qt is log productivity. Expression α− 1, as Blanchard (2005)
shows, is a parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production function. The interpretation given
is that for a certain level of the capital stock, the higher the level of employment (or
the lower the unemployment level), the lower the productivity and paid real wages (i.e.,
Blanchard (2005)). However, the opposite effect occurs if one agrees that lower unemploy-
ment translates into tighter labor markets. Hence, in a cointegrated system, a positive
shock that lowers the unemployment rate can either lower or increase real wages given
a certain level of the capital stock. Also, it is not warranted that real wages adjust to
the equilibrium level in the same way after positive and negative shocks. By treating the
positive and negative shocks differently, the TAR and MTAR cointegration tests allow for
a direct way of testing these implications. Specifically, when the two tests suggest that the
regression residuals (as in a Engle-Granger cointegration framework) are stationary, then
one can check the direction and significance of the adjustment coefficients by means of a
simple F-test.
On the same lines, Blanchard and Summers (1986) argue that insiders (i.e., workers
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who are already hired and part of the bargaining process) dominate the collective bargain-
ing process. Insiders do so by setting wages in their favor and hence negatively affect the
employment chances of the disenfranchised workers. In other words, when the wage setting
process is carried out only between firms and employed workers, then the unions care only
about the employment prospect of the ones already hired. Then, the wages reflect a given
level of unemployment. Whenever shocks lower or increase the employment level, wages
and unemployment also change to new levels. Therefore, while they both follow a random
walk, temporary innovations have permanent effects on wages and unemployment. How-
ever, this so called ”hysteresis” hypothesis has been labeled as too strong. It says that
changes in the unemployment rate have no implications on firms’ and workers’ bargaining
power. Once one allows outsiders to have some weight in the insiders’ objective function
or firms to have some bargaining power, then the wage does not rise to fully offset re-
ductions in the number of insiders. Thus, the unit root hypothesis for real wages and the
unemployment rate weakens; they may display persistence but not random walk behavior.
These assumptions can be tested empirically by means of the TAR and MTAR unit root
tests.
Finally, Layard and Nickell (1987) suggest that unemployment spells adversely affect
the skills and search behavior of the unemployed causing an increase in their duration
as jobless workers and therefore leading to unemployment persistence. This mechanism
suggests that because of the fear of becoming unemployed, currently employed workers
accept a lower wage level on the short term due to the high unemployment; however,
this pressure on wages is likely to diminish as more workers became unemployable due
to the loss of skill and motivation. In a cointegrated system, this implies that negative
unemployment shocks to real wages last only for a short period of time and are eventually
reversed. I extend this framework to allow the speed of decline to differ according to the
sign of the shocks.
Therefore, an analysis of the variables of interest such as real wages, the unemployment
rate, and the productivity level both separate and as a system offers the possibility of
testing the main ingredients of the theoretical models discussed above. Next I discuss the
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TAR and MTAR unit root and cointegration tests.
2.2 TAR and MTAR Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
A natural representation of the labor market equilibrium that has been tested before in
different forms by many economists like Hall (1986), Hall (1989), Mehra (1991), Nyomen
(1992), Bruno and Piselli (1997), Jacobson et al. (1998) and Lee (2000) is given by:
δ0 + δ1wt + δ2qt + δ3ut = µt (4)
where in addition to the variables already introduced, µt is a disturbance term. Note that
there is not a predetermined sign of the correlations among our variables of interest since
this is not a structural relationship (Diboogˇlu and Enders (2001)). Standard unit root
tests suggest that our variables of interest are I(1). However, in contrast to these tests,
Enders and Granger (1998) develop a class of models that test for unit root in the presence
of asymmetric adjustment. The threshold autoregressive (TAR) model is represented by:
∆xt =


ρ1xt−1 + εt, if xt−1 ≥ τTAR ;
ρ2xt−1 + εt, if xt−1 < τTAR.
(5)
where xt ∈ {wt, ut}. The xt process is ”threshold” stationary if −2 < (ρ1, ρ2) < 0 and the
threshold is such that long-run equilibrium occurs at the point xt = τTAR. The adjustment
process can be written as:
∆xt = Itρ1[xt−1 − τTAR] + (1− It)ρ2[xt−1 − τTAR] + εt (6)
where
It =


1, if xt−1 ≥ τTAR;
0, if xt−1 < τTAR.
(7)
Enders and Granger (1998) suggest that the threshold should be obtained by employing
the ”consistent” method of Chan (1993): search over all values of τTAR such that the sum
of squared residuals is minimized. Of course, in order to ensure the white-noise property
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of the residuals, the test should be augmented with lags until the autocorrelations of the
residuals fail to show any significance. The momentum threshold autoregressive unit root
test (MTAR) is similar to the TAR model except for the way the Heaviside indicator is
specified:
It =


1, if ∆xt−1 ≥ τMTAR;
0, if ∆xt−1 < τMTAR.
(8)
Thus, the decay depends on the previous period’s change in xt−1.
However, for series like real wages and productivity it is more likely that the threshold
or the attractor is a linear time trend. Thus for real wages and productivity, the threshold
is modified to τTAR = τ0 + τ1(t− 1).
The cointegration tests in Enders and Siklos (2001) follow the same general pattern.
The test for common trends among real wages, productivity and the unemployment rate
is performed by checking whether the residuals µt in equation (4) are ”threshold” or
”momentum” stationary. Hence we can write:
∆µt = Itρ
′
1[µt−1 − τ
′
TAR] + (1− It)ρ
′
2[µt−1 − τ
′
TAR] + εt (9)
where:
It =


1, if µt−1 ≥ τ
′
TAR;
0, if µt−1 < τ
′
TAR.
(10)
Further, Enders and Granger (1998) show that if the alternative hypothesis of stationarity
is accepted, it is possible to test for symmetric versus asymmetric adjustment because
ρ′1 and ρ
′
2 converge to multivariate normal distributions (however this assumes that the
threshold is known). If ρ′1 and ρ
′
2 are statistically different from each other then, after a
positive shock, µt−1 will be above the threshold and the adjustment is ρ
′
1µt−1, while after
a negative innovation, µt−1 is below the threshold and the adjustment is ρ
′
2µt−1. We can
similarly write the formulas for cointegration with MTAR adjustment.
The general procedure is to regress one of the variables on the other two, save the
residuals, and then check whether they are stationary with non-linear adjustment around
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a threshold value by means of TAR and MTAR unit root tests. Enders and Granger (1998)
suggest that in practice, to have a sufficient number of observations in both regimes one
should trim the first and last 15% of the sample. The optimal lag length is determined
via the minimization of the BIC criterion and further checks of the residuals to ensure
their white-noise property. Finally, if the hypothesis of stationarity is accepted then the
restriction that the adjustment process is actually symmetric (i.e., H(0) : ρ1 = ρ2) can
be tested by employing the usual F-test. However, Enders and Falk (1998) and Hansen
(1997) show that the OLS standard errors of ρ1 and ρ2 are inflated and thus inference
regarding their estimates is not straightforward.
3 Empirical Results
The dataset was obtained from several sources detailed in the Appendix. The countries
for which sufficient information was available, beginning with the first quarter of 1960,
are: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Spain, Sweden, UK, and US. Although the data contained sufficient information for
Canada, I left it out as it has already been considered by Diboogˇlu and Enders (2001). For
Finland and Japan I have information on all variables from 1960:1 to 2005:2. For the rest
the data varies, although starting with 1984:1 there is full information on each variable
for all countries. Some of the variables6 displayed strong seasonal patterns, hence, they
have been seasonally adjusted using the Tramo/Seats procedure available in Eviews 4.1.
On the sample under analysis, a standard Dickey-Fuller test finds that all variables have
a unit root. However, because of space considerations these have not been included.
Next, I test for unit roots using the TAR and MTAR tests that have been discussed
above. Following the economic intuition, I assume that unemployment rates adjust around
a level, while real wages and productivity adjust around a linear time trend. Table 1 shows
the results for the unemployment rate, Table 3 shows those for the real wages and Table
2 shows the results for productivity.
6Seasonally adjusted series are: Austria - qt, ut; Finland - ut; France - qt; Norway - qt; Spain - qt, wt;
Sweden - qt, ut; UK - qt
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[Insert Table 1]
[Insert Table 2]
[Insert Table 3]
With the exception of Sweden and the US, for which the TAR statistic is significant
at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively, all the other restrictions of ρ1 and ρ2
being jointly zero are not binding at any significance level. Therefore, even if one allows
for asymmetric adjustment, unemployment rates have a unit root. The same conclusion is
found for real wages and productivity. All TAR statistics for real wages (with the exception
of those for Japan and Netherlands) are not significant at conventional significance levels,
finding that implies nonstationarity. With momentum adjustment, only in the US do real
wages display a nonlinear deterministic trend. These results bring overwhelming evidence
in favor of nonstationarity for unemployment, real wages, and productivity in OECD
countries. These results support the ”hysteresis” hypothesis.
Next I estimate equation (4) by applying the TAR and MTAR tests to the residuals
from the regression of real wages on productivity and the unemployment rate. Given the
unit root properties of our variables of interest even after controlling for the possibility of
a threshold adjustment, this approach seems justified.
Table 4 reports the results from the cointegration tests using both methods.
[Insert Table 4]
The second column reports the number of lags such that the residuals display white-noise
properties and the third and fourth columns contain the TAR and MTAR statistics to-
gether with their statistical significance. TAR test brings evidence of cointegration for
five of the countries under study, while the MTAR approach reduces this number to five.
With the exception of Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and the US for which three and four
lags respectively are necessary to make the residuals behave as white-noise processes, the
other countries do not require additional lags. Tables 4 and 5 highlight several interesting
estimates of the equilibrium relationships for the countries for which cointegration is con-
firmed. The second column identifies the threshold values of the residuals resulting from
the cointegrating relationship, the next two display the speed of adjustment coefficients
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to the long run equilibrium after positive and negative shocks, the fourth and fifth show
the F-test for symmetric adjustment with the associated p-values, while the last column
contains the estimated long-run relationships. The long-run equilibrium is the same irre-
spective of the method used. The countries for which cointegration using TAR approach
holds are: Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, while for Germany and Sweden
the MTAR method no longer suggests that the variables considered trend together over
time. Additionally, using the MTAR method, cointegration is also confirmed for the US.
In Table 5 the estimated F-statistic for the null of symmetric adjustment is significant
at the 1% level for three out of the six countries for which the TAR test suggests cointe-
gration: Germany, Japan, and Sweden.
[Insert Table 5]
However, since the MTAR test fails to find evidence of cointegration for Germany and
Sweden, the countries that maintain the asymmetric adjustment to the long run equilib-
rium with different growth and decay differentials are Japan and the US. Nevertheless,
several interesting facts emerge regarding the size of the speed of adjustment coefficients.
For the countries for which the evidence supports asymmetric adjustment using the TAR
approach, in two cases (i.e., Germany and Japan) positive shocks are eliminated more
quickly than negative ones (i.e., sixteen and eight times more respectively), and only for
Sweden do negative shocks diminish more quickly (i.e., approximately twenty times faster).
This is not surprising given that Sweden has long been known for its strong unions and
early centralized bargaining system or, as Blanchard (2005) puts it, as a ”poster child for
the case of corporatism.” Also, both Spain and UK display faster adjustment after negative
shocks, although the adjustment after negative shocks is not significantly different from
the adjustment after positive ones. Given that the unemployment rates in these countries
have had sustained downward trends beginning with the 1990’s (whereas countries like
Germany and Japan have had strong upward ones), it appears that countries with either
very centralized or very decentralized bargaining systems cope better with adverse shocks
than ones with intermediate ones (i.e., in line with Calmfors and Driffill (1988) findings).
The MTAR approach has mixed results.
[Insert Table 6]
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In Table 6 we see that in Japan’s case a positive shock is eliminated more quickly than a
negative one, while in the US’s case a negative shock is eliminated more quickly. Next, I
perform the error correction specification and the impulse response functions that should
add more light on the findings so far.
4 Asymmetric Error Correction of Real Wages and Unem-
ployment
As part of the same economic community that eventually led to the formation of the
European Union, the OECD European countries have aimed for real convergence, common
policies and institutions. However, some countries have been more successful than others
at lowering their unemployment levels while keeping other macro variables in check. Given
our discussion above, one way these differences may appear is through the fact that in half
of the countries under analysis labor productivity, real wages and unemployment do not
trend together over time, while in the other half they do. Among the latter, almost half
display asymmetric adjustment, while the other half does not.
The first box contains the TAR error correction representation, while box 2 displays
the MTAR one.
[Insert Box 1]
[Insert Box 2]
For comparison purposes, even for the countries for which the F-test favors the symmetric
adjustment mechanism I report the error-correction with asymmetric speed of adjustment
coefficients. Several facts are worth noting. In box 1, in three out of five cases the real
wage grows more quickly after negative deviations from the long-run equilibrium than it
does after positive ones. In all cases, the speed of adjustment coefficients after negative
deviations have the correct sign, while for positive deviations only Japan and Sweden’s
have the correct sign; in the rest, the sign of the coefficients suggests that after a positive
shock there are further departures from the long-run equilibrium. This suggests limited
downward real wage flexibility for Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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In contrast, in box 2, in three out of four cases the correction to equilibrium after
an increase over last period’s real wage growth is greater than the adjustment after a
negative deviation. Moreover, none of the speed of adjustment coefficients after negative
shocks seem to be significantly different from zero. The positive adjustment coefficients in
four cases7 have the desired sign, while the adjustment coefficients after negative deviations
suggests that in two cases8 there are further reductions of the real wages. This shows that
the form of the Heaviside indicator (i.e. level versus first difference) matters for the sign
and direction of the speed of adjustment coefficients.
In box 1 none of the adjustment coefficients of the unemployment rate to its natural
rate after an increase from its previous level appears significant; moreover, in four out of
six cases the sign suggests further departure from equilibrium. When the unemployment
rate suddenly decreases the adjustment coefficient is significant only for Spain. However,
its magnitude suggests a quick reverse to the long-run equilibrium.
The same situation occurs in box 2. The speed of adjustment coefficients after positive
deviations are significant only for Sweden, while the ones for negative deviations (with
the exception of Spain), do not seem to be different from zero. Although a thorough
interpretation is difficult, at least for positive shocks the unemployment rate deviations
seem to be more persistent than those for real wages. Overall, both the AIC and the BIC
criterions favor TAR error correction mechanisms over the MTAR ones. In other words,
the asymmetric properties of the system of equations are based on the different adjustment
from the previous level and not from its previous growth rate.
Focusing only on the countries with asymmetric adjustment, it seems that overall
productivity and real wages close the gap after deviations from the long run equilibrium,
while unemployment does not seem to be as responsive. This lines up with the initial
findings of Diboogˇlu and Enders (2001).
These results are once again confirmed by the impulse response functions9 of real
7These countries are Japan, UK, and the US
8These are Japan and Spain
9I allow for a one time positive and negative unit shock respectively. However, it is possible to generalize
the impulse response functions to allow for the effects of any ensuing shocks.
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wages and unemployment using the Choleski decomposition. The order of decomposition is
qt → wt → ut (i.e. labor productivity precedes real wages which precede the unemployment
rate). Assuming that the system is in long run equilibrium, I find that positive and negative
shocks affect the behavior of real wages and unemployment differently.
Productivity shocks, irrespective of their sign, ultimately appear to move real wages
to a higher level. Roughly three years after the initial productivity shock, real wages
are 1% to 6% higher. It appears that the positive regime dominates. Thus, a negative
productivity shock negatively affects real wages up to three quarters. Once the impulse
response function enters positive territory, real wages appear to settle around a higher
level. This confirms again the downward real wage rigidities that we found for Germany
and Sweden. Real wages own shocks are quickly extinguished. In general it takes about
one year to achieve convergence to the initial equilibrium. Somewhat surprisingly, any
unemployment shock appears to have a positive effect on real wages. This result differs
from the implications of equation (2), which suggests the opposite. A possible explanation
is that shocks which lower unemployment lead to tighter labor markets, thus pushing wage
costs higher. Alternatively, these results support the arguments of Layard and Nickell
(1987), who argue that higher unemployment increases the unemployment spell, which in
turn causes a loss in the skills of an applicant. They show that this process can lower the
downward pressure on real wages. Therefore, as the theoretical arguments and the impulse
response functions suggest, shocks to unemployment on average cause real wages to go up.
Nevertheless, this upward effect does not appear very strong. Three years out, about 96%
to 99% of the initial shock is eliminated. Also note that the effect of a shock on real
wages is asymmetric and depends upon its sign. Thus, at least for unemployment shocks,
positive shocks to real wages appear stronger. Excluding Germany, for which positive and
negative shocks are almost indistinguishable, for Japan and the US, positive shocks up to
four quarters are higher than negative ones. For Japan there is almost no response until
the second quarter. This fact strengthens the arguments of Layard and Nickell (1987).
Overall, shocks to unemployment seem to have a significant and permanent effect.
Thus, with the exception of Japan (for which unemployment own shocks and productiv-
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ity shocks are extinguished in one and three years, respectively), for the rest the impulse
response functions converge to levels which are different from zero. Thus, after a unit pro-
ductivity shock, unemployment decreases by about 16% in Germany and 180% in US. In
Germany, a negative productivity shock induces fairly large swings in the unemployment
rate, while in the US a negative shock causes unemployment to rise for almost six quar-
ters. After this period, the unemployment starts to decrease. For Sweden, productivity
shocks cause unemployment to grow at levels which are about 50% higher. In this case, a
positive productivity shock lowers unemployment up to four quarters. Beyond this period
unemployment tends to go up again. Note again the asymmetry in the path of the positive
and negative disturbances. In general, adverse productivity shocks seem to have a bigger
impact on unemployment than positive ones. Positive real wage shocks appear to induce
more applicants to enter the job market and get hired. This effect reaches a maximum at
two and three quarters after the initial shock and is strongest for the US labor market
where, even three years after the initial shock, unemployment is down by almost 150%.
Unemployment own shocks also do not die out but converge to a level that is different
from zero. Thus, twelve quarters out, unemployment is 50% higher in Sweden and 100%
lower in the US. In Germany, this level is about 25% lower.
To summarize, the response of real wages to shocks that increase the unemployment
rate suggests that, in line with the findings of Layard and Nickell (1987), duration effects
tend to lower the downward pressure on real wages. Adverse productivity shocks appear to
have a bigger impact than positive ones. Initially, increases in real wages seem to attract
more workers to the job market. However, the offsetting effect is higher wage costs for
firms. Thus, unemployment can be higher or lower depending on which effect is stronger
(e.g., for instance in Germany and the US unemployment ends up lower, while in Japan
and Sweden it ends up higher). Alternatively, increases of the unemployment rate such that
it is persistently above its natural rate are, according to Hellwig and Neumann (1987), a
result of real wage increases possibly due to workers’ demands. In almost all cases, the
impulse response functions are different with respect to the sign of the initial shocks.
Therefore, just a symmetric representation would be inappropriate.
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5 Conclusions
Using a set of unit root and cointegration tests with asymmetric adjustment I test the
implications of some of the main labor market models developed in the literature. Even
after adjusting for non-linear effects around a threshold level and time trend respectively,
I find that, in general, in OECD countries unemployment, real wages, and productivity
have a unit root. These findings support the implications of the ”hysteresis” hypothesis.
However, the results of the paper only partially support the capital accumulation theories
of Bean and Dreze (1990), who suggest labor productivity, real wages, and unemployment
have common trends. For more than half of the countries for which the variables of interest
are cointegrated, the adjustment to long-run equilibrium is achieved in a non-linear fashion.
Hence, allowing only for linear error-correction mechanisms would be biased.
The response of real wages and unemployment rates differ according to the sign of
the shocks. I find that for countries with strong welfare systems like Sweden and UK,
negative deviations from the long run equilibrium are eliminated more quickly than posi-
tive ones; for intermediate ones (e.g., Germany) positive deviations are eliminated faster.
This aligns with previous findings (i.e. Calmfors and Driffill (1988)). It also appears that
negative shocks have a bigger impact than positive ones. I further find that, according
to Layard and Nickell (1987), shocks that lead to higher unemployment and duration ef-
fects like those mentioned in the introductory section lower the downward pressure on
real wages. Also, temporary shocks to unemployment seem to have a bigger impact and
more persistence than those to real wages. On the short term (i.e., up to two and three
quarters), positive real wages shocks appear to lower unemployment. This could indicate
a higher labor force participation due to the increased attractiveness of the labor market.
The offsetting effect is an increase in the wage costs of firms that can in turn raise un-
employment. Thus, unemployment rates can end up higher or lower, depending on which
effect is stronger. In some countries, real wages shocks lower unemployment (i.e., Germany
and the US), while in others the unemployment rate goes up (i.e., Japan and Sweden).
Hence, I find mixed evidence for the results of Hellwig and Neumann (1987), who argue
that real wage increases due to workers’ demands cause unemployment to rise above its
17
natural level.
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Appendix
Data Sources
w = Nominal Wage/CPI;
q = Real GDP/Employment
1. Australia:
• w=Wages:Weekly Earnings∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000 = 100∗∗
2. Austria:
• w=Hourly Earnings (manufacturing,SA),units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗
3. Denmark:
• w=Hourly Earnings (manufacturing,SA),units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=Ind. Prod.(SA),(2000=100)∗/Employment: Manufacturing (Thousands)∗∗
4. Finland:
• w=Hourly Earnings (manufacturing,SA),units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=Ind. Prod. (SA):(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗∗
5. France:
• w=Hourly Earnings (manufacturing,SA),units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗∗∗
6. Germany:
• w=Hourly Earnings (manufacturing,SA),units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗
7. Japan:
• w=Wages:Monthly Earnings∗/CPI:All Cities∗
• q=Ind.Prod. SA∗/Mfg. Employment, SA: 2000=100∗
8. Netherlands:
• w=Hourly Earnings (manufacturing,SA),units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗
9. Norway:
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• w=Hourly Earnings (manufacturing,SA),units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗∗
10. Spain:
• w=Hourly Wages∗/CPI (No specifics available)∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗
11. Sweden
• w=Avg. Hrly. Earnings (manufacturing,SA,units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗∗
12. UK:
• w=Hourly Earnings (manufacturing,SA),units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗∗
13. US:
• w=Hourly Earnings (manufacturing,SA),units 2000=100∗∗/CPI:2000=100∗∗
• q=GDP VOL.(2000=100)∗/Civilian Employment: 2000=100∗∗
∗ Source: IFS CD-ROM:65ey,September 2005; ∗∗ Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, VOL 2004 release
04;∗∗∗ Source: OECD Employment and Labor Market Statistics, VOL. 2004 release 04;
The Unemployment Rates have been obtained from the Global Insight database with the exception of those for
Australia∗∗∗ Canada∗∗ and US∗∗.
Boxes and Tables
Box 1: Dynamic Adjustment using TAR Error-Correction
• Germany:
∆qt = -0.103∆qt−1 + 0.353∆wt−1 - 0.002∆ut−1 + 0.159∗∗∗zplust−1 - 0.013zminust−1
∆wt = -0.007∆qt−1 + 0.241∆wt−1 - 0.0004∆ut−1 + 0.012zplust−1 - 0.018zminust−1
∆ut = 0.543∆qt−1 - 0.264∆wt−1 + 0.560∆ut−1 + 0.137zplust−1 + 0.619zminust−1
zplust = It(wt − 0.364 − 0.454qt − 0.017ut); zminust = (1 − It)(wt − 0.364 − 0.454qt − 0.017ut) AIC =
-3512.4638; BIC = -3465.42685
• Japan:
∆qt = 0.584∆qt−1 - 0.003∆wt−1+ 0.006∆ut−1 + 0.012zplust−1 - 0.014zminust−1
∆wt = 0.061∆qt−1 + 0.039∆wt−1+ 0.030∆ut−1 - 0.188∗∗∗zplust−1 - 0.041zminust−1
∆ut = -1.338∆qt−1 - 0.089∆wt−1 + 0.187∆ut−1 + 0.026zplust−1 - 0.066zminust−1
zplust = It(wt − 0.774 − 0.014qt − 0.041ut); zminust = (1 − It)(wt − 0.774 − 0.014qt − 0.041ut) AIC =
-3470.7296; BIC = -3423.0028
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• Spain:
∆qt = 0.089∆qt−1 + 0.071∆wt−1+ 0.002∆ut−1 + 0.255∗∗∗zplust−1 + 0.112zminust−1
∆wt = 0.248∆qt−1 - 0.377∆wt−1+ 0.001∆ut−1 + 0.136∗∗∗zplust−1 - 0.111∗∗zminust−1
∆ut = 0.225∆qt−1 - 6.136∆wt−1 + 0.853∆ut−1 - 1.046zplust−1 - 5.020∗∗∗zminust−1
zplust = It(wt − 0.368 − 0.745qt + 0.007ut); zminust = (1 − It)(wt − 0.368 − 0.745qt + 0.007ut) AIC =
-1970.7256; BIC = -1933.0627
• Sweden:
∆qt = -0.037∆qt−1 + 0.100∆wt−1+ 0.006∆ut−1 + 0.026zplust−1 - 0.057zminust−1
∆wt = 0.304∆qt−1 -0.118∆wt−1- 0.003∆ut−1 - 0.074zplust−1 - 0.209∗∗∗zminust−1
∆ut = -0.227∆qt−1 - 1.920∆wt−1 + 0.648∆ut−1 - 0.613zplust−1 - 1.154zminust−1
zplust = It(wt − 0.267− 0.787qt + 0.013ut); zminust = (1− It)(wt − 0.267− 0.787qt + 0.013ut)
• United Kingdom:
∆qt = A12(L)∆qt−1 +A21(L)∆wt−1+ A13(L)∆ut−1 + 0.0464zplust−1 +0.0571zminust−1
∆wt = A21(L)∆qt−1 + A22(L)∆wt−1+ A23(L)∆ut−1 - 0.0578zplust−1 - 0.1317zminust−1
∆ut = A31(L)∆qt−1 + A32(L)∆wt−1 + A33(L)∆ut−1 + 0.1752zplust−1 - 4.034zminust−1
zplust = It(wt + 0.100 − 1.130qt + 0.003ut); zminust = (1 − It)(wt + 0.100 − 1.130qt + 0.003ut) AIC =
-3184.5749; BIC=-3084.5705
Box 2: Dynamic Adjustment using MTAR Error-Correction
• Japan:
∆qt = 0.619∆qt−1 + 0.003∆wt−1+ 0.007∆ut−1 + 0.004zplust−1 - 0.009zminust−1
∆wt = -0.151∆qt−1 + 0.012∆wt−1+ 0.015∆ut−1 - 0.177∗∗∗zplust−1 + 0.024zminust−1
∆ut = -1.214∆qt−1 - 0.063∆wt−1 + 0.193∆ut−1 - 0.011zplust−1 - 0.031zminust−1
zplust = It(wt − 0.774 − 0.014qt − 0.041ut); zminust = (1 − It)(wt − 0.774 − 0.014qt − 0.041ut) AIC =
-3470.5665; BIC = -3422.8398
• Spain:
∆qt = 0.128∆qt−1 + 0.164∆wt−1+ 0.001∆ut−1 + 0.346∗∗∗zplust−1 + 0.064zminust−1
∆wt = 0.314∆qt−1 - 0.307∆wt−1+ 0.0001∆ut−1 + 0.005zplust−1 + 0.036zminust−1
∆ut = 1.289∆qt−1 - 5.849∆wt−1 + 0.845∆ut−1 - 5.734∗∗∗zplust−1 - 0.590∗∗∗zminust−1
zplust = It(wt − 0.368 − 0.745qt + 0.007ut); zminust = (1 − It)(wt − 0.368 − 0.745qt + 0.007ut) AIC =
-1965.9087; BIC = -1928.2458
• United Kingdom:
∆qt = A12(L)∆qt−1 +A21(L)∆wt−1+ A13(L)∆ut−1 - 0.0074zplust−1 +0.1102∗∗zminust−1
∆wt = A21(L)∆qt−1 + A22(L)∆wt−1+ A23(L)∆ut−1 - 0.0951zplust−1 - 0.0880zminust−1
∆ut = A31(L)∆qt−1 + A32(L)∆wt−1 + A33(L)∆ut−1 + 0.1148zplust−1 - 1.8997zminust−1
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zplust = It(wt + 0.100 − 1.130qt + 0.003ut); zminust = (1 − It)(wt + 0.100 − 1.130qt + 0.003ut) AIC =
-3177.6506; BIC = -3077.6461
• United States:
∆qt = 0.074∆qt−1 +0.129∆wt−1-0.000 ∆ut−1 - 0.016zplust−1 -0.025∗∗zminust−1
∆wt = 0.052∆qt−1 + 0.207∆wt−1+ 0.002∆ut−1 -0.030∗∗zplust−1 -0.024zminust−1
∆ut = -4.527∆qt−1 -3.233∆wt−1 + 0.606∆ut−1 + 0.303zplust−1 + 0.527zminust−1
zplust = It(wt − 0.855− 0.099qt − 0.012ut); zminust = (1− It)(wt − 0.855− 0.099qt − 0.012ut)
∗ Significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗ Significance at the 1% level
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Tables
Table 1: Results from TAR and MTAR Unit Root tests - Unemployment Rate
UR Lags† TAR TAR - H(0):ρ1=ρ2 MTAR MTAR - H(0):ρ1=ρ2
Australia 1 2.34337 n.a. 0.30299 n.a.
Austria 0 0.56903 n.a. 1.11689 n.a.
Denmark 1 2.68453 n.a. 2.34898 n.a.
Finland 2 4.31286 n.a. 1.71133 n.a.
France 1 4.22101 n.a. 0.15942 n.a.
Germany 1 4.65617 n.a. 1.95860 n.a.
Japan 4 2.29123 n.a. 0.08008 n.a.
Netherlands 1 3.06332 n.a. 2.43406 n.a.
Norway 2 4.96928 n.a. 1.62977 n.a.
Spain 1 1.36946 n.a. 1.37896 n.a.
Sweden 1 6.92789∗∗ 11.560∗∗∗ 0.64380 n.a.
UK 5 2.00386 n.a. 1.97291 n.a.
US 2 5.10341∗ 3.81511∗ 2.10172 n.a.
† Minimize BIC criterion; ∗ Significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗ Significance at the
1% level
Table 2: Results from TAR and MTAR Unit Root tests - Productivity
RW Lags† TAR ρ1x
+ ρ2x
− ρ1=ρ2 MTAR ρ1x
+ ρ2x
− ρ1=ρ2
Australia 1 2.465 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.895 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Austria 1 1.905 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.785 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Denmark 0 35.262∗∗∗ -0.870∗∗∗ -0.976∗∗∗ 0.228 35.058∗∗∗ -0.914∗∗∗ -0.934∗∗∗ 0.007
Finland 4 1.310 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.625 n.a. n.a. n.a.
France 4 3.275 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.706 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Germany 4 2.195 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.960 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan 2 8.541∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 0.289 3.655 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 0 3.661 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.712 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Norway 1 3.534 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.539 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain 2 1.724 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.566 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sweden 1 0.262 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.309 n.a. n.a. n.a.
UK 3 3.030 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.017 n.a. n.a. n.a.
US 0 0.628 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.181 n.a. n.a. n.a.
† Minimize BIC criterion; ∗ Significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significance at the 5% level;
∗∗∗ Significance at the 1% level
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Table 3: Results from TAR and MTAR Unit Root tests - Real Wages
RW Lags† TAR ρ1x
+ ρ2x
− ρ1=ρ2 MTAR ρ1x
+ ρ2x
− ρ1=ρ2
Australia 0 1.537 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.660 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Austria 5 0.568 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.661 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Denmark 0 0.543 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.643 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Finland 5 3.116 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.895 n.a. n.a. n.a.
France 4 0.694 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.487 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Germany 5 1.211 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.091 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan 0 6.844∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.054 2.557 9.165∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ 0.021 6.928∗∗∗
Netherlands 4 5.877∗ -0.044∗ -0.075∗∗ 0.718 6.101∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.035 1.132
Norway 0 2.267 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.924 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain 8 0.798 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.857 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sweden 8 1.634 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.736 n.a. n.a. n.a.
UK 3 2.602 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.828 n.a. n.a. n.a.
US 4 2.815 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.811∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.071∗∗∗ 15.582∗∗∗
† Minimize BIC criterion; ∗ Significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significance at the 5% level;
∗∗∗ Significance at the 1% level
Table 4: Results from TAR and MTAR Cointegration Tests
Country Lags† TAR Cointegration MTAR Cointegration
Australia 0 4.659 3.755
Austria 1 2.464 2.286
Denmark 0 5.173 2.654
Finland 0 2.222 3.357
France 3 3.185 2.053
Germany 4 8.506∗∗∗ 4.398
Japan 0 10.780∗∗∗ 8.788∗∗∗
Netherlands 3 6.198 3.723
Norway 0 2.604 2.278
Spain 3 8.071∗∗∗ 8.863∗∗∗
Sweden 0 9.965∗∗∗ 5.875
UK 0 8.896∗∗∗ 8.707∗∗∗
US 3 4.629 7.178∗
† Minimizes BIC criterion; ∗ Significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗ Significance at
the 1% level
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Table 5: Summary on TAR Cointegration Tests
Country Threshold ρ1µ
+ ρ2µ
− ρ1=ρ2 P-value Long-run eq.
Germany 0.062 -0.284∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ 11.96 0.0006 w = 0.364 + 0.454q + 0.0179u
Japan 0.066 -0.288∗∗∗ -0.036 12.17 0.006 w = 0.774 + 0.014q+ 0.041u
Spain -0.0002 -0.232∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗ 0.539 0.464 w = 0.368 + 0.745q− 0.007u
Sweden -0.033 -0.063∗∗∗ -1.361∗∗∗ 13.161 0.0004 w = 0.267 + 0.787q− 0.013u
UK -0.004 -0.163∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ 0.883 0.349 w = −0.100 + 1.130q − 0.003u
US n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. w = 0.855 + 0.099q+ 0.012u
∗ Significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗ Significance at the 1% level
Table 6: Summary on MTAR Cointegration Tests
Country Threshold ρ1µ
+ ρ2µ
− ρ1=ρ2 P-value Long-run eq.
Germany n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. w = 0.364 + 0.454q + 0.0179u
Japan -0.017 -0.167∗∗∗ 0.028 6.196 0.013 w = 0.774 + 0.014q + 0.041u
Spain -0.001 -0.350∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗ 1.932 0.168 w = 0.368 + 0.745q − 0.007u
Sweden n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. w = 0.267 + 0.787q − 0.013u
UK 0.0001 -0.180∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ 0.207 0.649 w = −0.100 + 1.130q − 0.003u
US -0.023 0.009 -0.068∗∗∗ 8.831 0.003 w = 0.855 + 0.099q + 0.012u
∗ Significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗ Significance at the 1% level
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Sweden: Real Wages Responses to Productivity Shocks
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US: Unemployment Rate Responses to Productivity Shocks
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